I've been exposed to a lot of literature and reading, but I think this is the peak. One of my hobbies is debating policy debate competitively. Since the 7th grade, each and every one of the topics struck interest in me which then led me to read more literature on the topic and explore each resolution in depth.
This year, the resolution for high school policy debate is
Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially reduce its military and/or police presence in one or more of the following countries: South Korea, Japan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Turkey, or Kuwait.
Firstly, there is a ton of literature out on the internet and in books about North Korean threats and that there is an increased chance of more conflict in the area, considering the fact that in the past month, North Korea has already fired artillery shells at a South Korean island, Yeongpyong island. Also, a lot of credible sources support the fact that if the US military forces stay there, they could cause escalation with the US being involved. With US military building up on the border of North Korea, what ration leader would not want to build up their own forces for at least self defense? This is only one of the complex parts of the topic (1/6 of the topic, specifially).
The other scenario that I particularly think has a strong literature base and has decent arguments is affirming with the scenario of Afghanistan. Currently, there are two types of forces in Afghanistan: counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. However similar these two types of forces sound, there is seemingly a distinct difference that produces success or failure. Counter-terrorism operations do not work with Karzai, the "corrupt" leader as compared to counter-insurgency which does and tries to overthrow Karzai. What is apparent in the literature, especially from D'Souza and Boyle is that staying in close contact with Karzai only increases the corrupt-ness by allowing him to have leverage over the US military since he know Obama is committed to the war; all in all meaning Karzai can do whatever he wants and knows the US cannot do much about it without revoking and damaging its own credibility. The key argument is that the counter-insurgency currently works as a counter against any counter-terrorism operations which lead the affirmative to advocate withdrawing counter-insurgency presence.
This literature just interests me and apparently many authors out there. However, I am not saying what these authors are saying might necessarily be true, it just makes a very debatable argument. Keep in mind, I have only posted a way to affirm the resolution. What do YOU think are possible negations of the resolution?
Questions? Do you all have any opinions or input? I'm interested in what you all think. :)
Sources Consulted:
- Michael J. Boyle's article, "Do counterinsurgency and counterterrorism belong together?"
He is a very credible author because he is a lecturer in international relations and is an expert at studying terrorism and political violence at a University. (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00885.x/abstract)
- Shanthie Mariet D'Souza's article, "Talking to the Taliban: Will It Ensure "Peace" in Afghanistan?" D'Souza is also a reliable source because she is the associate at IDSA.
(http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a909698115~db=all~order=page)
- Khaleej Times' article, "Easing Tensions". This is also another reliable source because it provides new and insight into the situation
(http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/editorial/2011/January/editorial_January21.xml§ion=editorial&col=)
~Amber
UPDATE: a secret airbase (suspected/basically confirmed torture base in Afghanistan is revealed: Bagram Airbase



I agree with you, I think that we should reduce our military presence in those countries. While I feel it is important to back them, and be their allies in case of a World War, I think that getting too far involved with those countries could be fatal to our economy as well as our resources. Negatively, that could also encourage a even larger problem leading to another major war.
ReplyDeleteWhat a great job you have done Amber!
ReplyDeleteI do have one question though. Can you please go into a little more detail about the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency tactics, I am not sure I quite understand them. And how does staying in contact with the Karzai(is that what counter-terrorism does?) allow him(Karzai) allow him to have leverage over the United States, and how does the contact with the Karzai damage the US credibility. But isn't counter-insurgency a good thing because it is more successful than counter-terrorism, so why would we withdraw the counter-insurgency presence. Also, now I hope I don't sound too dumb, but would who mind explaining who the Karzai is(organization, specific person, etc)?
@suriya
ReplyDeleteYou bring up very good points about negating the resolution. I do agree that this topic is very easily debated both ways.
One of my favorite way to dispute these affirmative scenarios is through the arguement of deterrence. Essentially, without US military troop presence, we won't be able to deter any conflict pointed out in the affirmative. The literature on that is very broad and has a diversity of opinions associated along with it.
Thanks for your input! :)
@Aria
ReplyDeleteSure, counter-terrorism mainly has operations that deals with seeking and capturing suspected terrorists. These operations don't work correlate with Karzai. On the contrary, counter-insurgency missions are basically missions that try to overthrow and replace the government i.e. Karzai. (at least from what I understand from what I read)
Also, I'm glad you asked about the Karzai issue. See, Karzai essentially has a form of "control" over our military. When we see that Karzai wants to mount a program or initiate we deem hazardous, we send our military units as way of "redeption" or "help". In this way, Karzai sort of has an ability to get the US to do what they want with our military. It is sort of abstract but it's what many authors think is prolonging the current war. Some authors think counter-insurgency is not working and is doing worse than counter-terrorism, so that's a big debate going on. We think if we isolate Karzai, then he would have to build a stable state by himself without the corrupt leverage. The more we are there, the "less willing Karzai will accede to our demands" (quoted from Boyle).
And don't worry, haha, Karzai is the leader of Afghanistan right now.
Hope that cleared things up
Bravo!
ReplyDeleteIn my opinion, debate molds the mind for clear communication and broadens critical thinking skills. For some, like myself it allows ample opportunity to prepare for the political world, and the world of law and government. I have experienced that debate can also be a lot of fun. Such as running K's and crazy counter plans. In any sense, debate hits a certain place for someone. You bond with your team, and other fellow debaters. They are truely the only people that are about to relate to you, and understand what it's like to be murdered in cross-ex, or do a stand up rebutle. Even when you drop the round winning argument. I must say, that in my few months of debating, I have realized that debate is more than a sport (yes, in fact it is a sport, a mental contact sport)it allows us to shine, and prove to ourselves, and those around us, that we are the future, and whether we feel global nuclear war is good, or bad, that we, teenagers, will eventually grow up, and change the world.
Again, bravo Amber.
I hate hitting So Ko.
hahha amen, Bella.
ReplyDeleteAlso, So Ko rocks. :) but then again, so do you and your K's
What would we do about the deteriorating situation of the ANA (Afghan National Army) which does not even have enough money to feed itself for five years, according to evidence I have somewhere. Are we just going to leave them in a terrible state like that and say there is nothing we can do? At the very least we must try or die.
ReplyDelete@ Judson
ReplyDeleteThere are some pieces of literature out there that claim the opposite saying only isolating Karzai allows him to be able to train and build the stable state via the end of his corruption i.e. affirming the resolution.
But how can he train them without resources?
ReplyDeleteDon't forget, counter-terrorism troops are still there.
ReplyDeleteIt is just counter-insurgency we are removing.
lol so i know this is sorta suppose to be debate related....but uh lol how do you know diana? :P
ReplyDeletechuuuuuuuyingggggg
diana? which diana (last name)?
ReplyDeleteNice post! I would like to shed some more light on the distinction between counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency forces in Afghanistan. Counter-terrorism forces are those engaged in very specific operations at very specific targets (examples: drone strikes, night raids). However, counter-insurgency forces is the bulk of the US military, which is defined by its strategy: clear, hold, build. The 'clear' phase of the strategy is when we send in the troops to kill all of the terrorists in an area. Then, when they are all dead, we begin the 'hold' phase, in which we prevent them from taking over the area again. After we have established a firm hold, we begin the 'build' phase, in which we try to rebuild the local infrastructure and set up a functioning government in the area. The COIN strategy isn't centered at all around what Karzai wants, but rather its normally what the US wants: stability, so we can eventually withdraw. A lot of the time our actions in the 'build' phase are misinterpreted - people begin to think that we are supporting Karzai when we try and extend his government's reach into other areas. The US military does defend Karzai, because he is the cornerstone of the current government.
ReplyDeleteJumping back a bit, I think that the most important defining element of counterinsurgency is that it is focused on gathering the support of the population, as opposed to counter-terrorism which is just focused on targeted killings. COIN forces literally go into the street and talk with the people in order to gain their trust. Without their trust, it is argued that it is impossible to win the war for two main reasons. One, they will not give us intelligence on where the US military is, and two, they might even join the Taliban themselves because they dislike the US military in their country.
I do also disagree with you when you say that counterinsurgency operations hamper counter-terror operations. It is precisely because of this intelligence that the US is able to know WHERE the targets are to bomb/drone strike. History shows that COIN forces empirically work, from Malaya to Iraq, COIN was there to win the war for the US.
Some also argue that COIN forces are critical to send the perception to the Taliban that the US is committed to stability in the region. Without this commitment, Pakistan would 'hedge their bets', and support the Taliban because they think that the Taliban will be the strongest faction around when the US leaves. Losing Pakistan's support for the war on terror would be devestating - in fact, 8 out of 10 foreignpolicy.com experts (around 60-70 of them) ranked Pakistan the most dangerous terrorist haven country in the world. For this reason, we should keep COIN forces to ensure that Pakistan fights with us against the terrorists.
Judson brings up a good point regarding the competence of the ANA (Afghanistan National Army). For this reason, I think it would be to everyone's benefit if we switched the focus of training to one of quality over quantity. For example, instead of constantly trying to get more and more people to join their army, we should find the best ones and give them even more training. We should weed out all of the corruption so that they will have an effective army. Quality in an army in this instance is more important than quantity because the large quantity isn't fit for war: they are either illiterate or drug-addicts.
A new age is upon us. In a nuclear age, we must be increasingly cautious about terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons. We can only pray that that will never happen.
Very interesting, Amber. And Zach.
ReplyDelete